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ABSTRACT
n this study, using firm level data from twenty six transition economies collected
by the World Bank and the EBRD in 1999-2000, we conduct a set of logistic regression
models to investigate the composition of small and large firms’ business networks.
The results show that, in contrast to smaller firms, larger firms are more likely to have
formal business relationships, and relationships with national and foreign financial institutions,
government, and foreign firms. In addition, in a subgroup analysis of seven transition
economies we show that the composition of the firms’ business networks varies substantially
across countries but that the government is still a dominant client. Furthermore, we found
a large variation on firms’ reliance on informal ties and the extent to which firms exchange
with foreign firms.
RESUMO
este estudo, utilizando dados de firmas de vinte e seis economias em transição,
coletados pelo World Bank e EBRD em 1999-2000, conduzimos um conjunto de
modelos de regressão logísticos para investigar a composição das redes relacionais
de pequenas e grandes empresas. Os resultados mostram que, em contraste com
as pequenas empresas, as empresas maiores são mais propensas a ter relacionamentos
formais de negócios, e relacionamentos com instituições financeiras nacionais e internacio-
nais, governos e empresas internacionais. Adicionalmente, numa análise de subgrupos de
sete economias de transição, mostramos que a composição das redes relacionais das firmas
varia substancialmente de país para país e que o governo é, ainda, um cliente dominante.
Também verificamos uma grande variação na dependência das firmas em ligações infor-
mais e na quantidade de relacionamentos especificamente com empresas estrangeiras.
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Introdução
he composition of small and large firms’ business networks is likely to vary
substantially. While some scholars have suggested that firms’ business
networks evolve over their life cycles in response to strategies and
circumstances (Human & Provan, 2000; Hite & Hesterly, 2001), few studies
have attempted to test empirically how similar or different are the networks of
firms of different sizes, and whether in fact there is any difference. However, it is
likely that the composition, structure, configuration, and stability of firms’ business
networks are idiosyncratic to the firms’ needs (Gulati et al., 2000; Hite & Hesterly,
2001). For example, network ties are particularly important for small and/or young
firms whose legitimacy and reputation are not yet established (Saxenian, 1990;
Stuart et al., 1999; Human & Provan, 2000). Firms integrated in business networks
seem to have easier access to various types of resources (Lipparini & Sobrero,
1994) and information (Dyer & Singh, 1998) that improves their chances to detect
new market and innovation opportunities (Birley, 1985; Walker et al., 1997; Gulati,
1998; Hite & Hesterly, 2001) and gain reputation and social endorsement (Stuart
et al., 1999).
Previous research has suggested that there are significant differences in
terms of organizational structure, market focus, strategy, and resource
endowments between small and large firms (e.g., Stinchcombe, 1965; Mintzberg,
1979). For example, small and young firms are highly dependent on their personal
and cohesive social relationships (Hite & Hesterly, 2001) such as their relationships
with family members or friends on which they rely to obtain resources, gain
legitimacy (Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994; Human & Provan, 2000), and to overcome
possible disadvantages of newness and smallness (Stinchcombe, 1965).
Conversely, larger firms may seek business relationships for different strategic
motives (Hite & Hesterly, 2001) such as innovation, market access, financial needs,
and so forth. Thus, differences in the business relationships of small and large
firms are likely to be determined by both resource needs and by strategic moti-
ves. To some extent, the composition of the firms’ network is the result of a
planned strategy (Baum et al.,  2000) and of a rational and ‘calculative’ process
(Hite & Hesterly, 2001). However, the environment in which firms operate also
influence both firms’ resource deficiencies and strategies as well as their ability
to configure their networks. Hence, understanding how the composition of firms’
business networks may differ for small and large firms offers insight into why
firms may seek to modify their business networks. In addition, examining how
this occurs in transition economies offers insight into the influence of the economic
and institutional environment on firms’ ability to establish business ties.
Firms in transition economies may need to rely more on their ability to form
ties to other firms than firms in developed countries. Transition economies present
an interesting context for studying business networks because, in this context,
networks may not only be essential for firms’ survival but they may also facilitate
firms’ adjustment to a business environment that is changing continuously. In
this condition we may expect reputation and legitimacy to be a stronger referral
than we probably consider in more institutionally developed countries.
Furthermore, the lack of effective and efficient institutions in transition economies
may require inter-firms forms of collaboration to overcome resource limitations in
such an extensive manner that is not a primary concern for firms in institutionally
developed countries. For example, Roth and Kostova (2001) noted that firms in
transition economies tend to substitute formal business relationships by infor-
mal relationships. Notwithstanding, extant research has focused essentially on
developed countries, primarily on the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994; Human & Provan,
2000) and Europe (e.g., Piore & Sabel’s (1984) work on the industrial districts in
Europe). Consequently, while it seems reasonable that the configuration of firms’
business network may differ in transition countries from that most likely to be
observed in more institutionally and economically developed western countries,
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empirically, we know very little about whether and how the composition of firms’
business network may differ in other economic environments, namely in transition
economies.
In this study, we contrast the networks of small and large firms in transition
economies. This study contributes to our understanding of firms’ networks in
transition economies as a facilitating mechanism for firms’ ability to ride through
the transition period. This study further permits us to draw some dissimilarities
among transition countries evidencing that more fine grained examinations, in
contrast to studies that group all transition countries together, are required to
understand contextual factors as well as firms’ characteristics that influence the
composition of firms’ networks. Specifically, on a sample of firms from twenty six
transition economies, we empirically test whether the composition of firms’ business
network varies for small and large firms. The remaining of this study is structured
in three main sections. The first section entails a brief literature review with the
development of hypotheses, anchored in the idea that firms rely on their business
networks where the composition of these networks differs significantly depending
on firms’ size and country of origin. The second section develops the empirical
method and includes the description of the data, variables, and results. The third
section comprises a discussion of the results, implications, and avenues for future
research.
Firms’ Business Networks
The composition of a firm’s business network refers to the types of
organizations or the portfolio of members that are included in the organization’s
business network (Baum et al., 2000; Gulati et al., 2000). Following Hite and Hesterly
(2001) we restrict our analysis to the firm’s ego network, and to the actors directly
connected with a focal firm. Therefore, we focus on network composition in terms
of the partners with which each focal firm has direct business relationships. That
is, we assessed whether the firms had a business relationship to a certain economic
agent.
Small firms have, per definition, a limited pool of managerial, financial,
informational, and human resources (Stinchcombe, 1965; Beamish, 1999). Therefore,
small firms may need to rely more on their business networks to overcome resource
and informational constraints to improve their likelihood of survival and success
(Birley, 1985; Jack & Anderson, 2002). For example, Fontes and Coombs (1997)
observed that business relationships are often aimed at accessing complementary
activities or at compensating for deficiencies. Business relationships also expose
firms to information and other resources not yet held, hence, providing growth
opportunities.
Partnering with other organizations may be an effective way to minimize
transaction costs, increase market power, promote learning, share risk (Larson,
1992; Gulati et al., 2000; Lu & Beamish, 2001), obtain endorsement (Stuart et al.,
1999), and favor the access to an array of physical and intangible resources. We
will review some arguments for why a firm enters a network in the following section
but it is worth noting outright that, in this study, we build on Hite and Hesterly’s
(2001) conceptual idea that firms’ membership in a network of business relationships
may not only be a resource dependence necessity but also a strategy. Firms engage
in business relationships not only to overcome current resource limitations but
also to realize strategic objectives such as survival, growth, or market entry. If this
is the case, not only we could expect to observe firms of different sizes engaging
in dissimilar network arrangements, but we may also expect that the business
environment of the firm (i.e., the institutional environment) will lead firms to seek
different portfolios of relationships.
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Formalization of business ties
The business networks of small firms are likely to be predominantly
composed of informal and path dependent business relationships. Informal
relationships are frequently the owners’ personal relationships (Dubini & Aldrich,
1991; Hite & Hesterly, 2001) and refer to personal and generally non-contrac-
tual relationships (Macaulay, 1963; Granovetter, 1985) such as family ties (Larson,
1992), friendship relationships (Peng & Luo, 2000), affiliation connections
(Macaulay, 1963), and community bonds (Galaskiewicz, 1979). Small firms
frequently lack influence, endorsement, perception of quality, reliability,
reputation, and legitimacy (Boeker, 1989; Larson, 1992). As a result, other
organizations may hesitate to form formal relationships with small firms (Stuart
et al., 1999). Ferreira (2002) suggested a parenting model whereby new, and
possibly small, firms tend to exploit existing informal relationships with their
parent firms instead of exploring new relationships with firms outside the
parental network of relationships. In sum, the firms’ informal network of business
relationships are an important vehicle for information, reputation, advice, referral,
market selection, market entry facilitation, and commercial expansion (Oviatt &
McDougall, 1995; Jack & Anderson, 2002) particularly for small firms.
In contrast to small firms, large firms are more likely to rely on formal business
relationships. Although informal relationships may provide sufficient resources when
firms are small, firms’ growth often requires additional resources not met by existing
informal relationships. For example, large firms may need to seek financial
institutions with the capacity to meet larger financial capital requirements.
Alternatively, large firms may seek financing in capital markets going public, which
bears significant monitoring by external agents, institutional investors, and financial
regulation institutions (Aggarwal & Rivoli, 1991) that are generally outside the
possibilities of small firms. Therefore, as small firms grow to become larger
corporations it is reasonable to assume that more formal exchange governance
mechanisms, possibly governed by contracts, will gain predominance. These may
be business relationships with local and national governments, with major clients
and suppliers, with foreign firms, and with financial service firms both domestic
and foreign. In other words, large firms are likely to be perceived as having higher
reputation and stable operations, which facilitates establishing formal ties with
other firms. Moreover, prior relationships with other large and prestigious firms
increase the likelihood of forming subsequent additional formal relationships (Gulati,
1995) due to acquired legitimacy and reputation (Human & Provan, 2000). To
conclude, large firms have accumulated experience, resources, and prior
relationships, which downplay the importance of, and dependence on, informal
business relationships. Thus, large firms are more likely to have a larger pool of
formal, as opposed to informal, business relationships with other agents than
small firms.
In transition economies, the transaction costs are generally higher than
in institutionally developed countries (Meyer, 2001) and these transaction costs
are likely to be higher for exchanges with small firms than with large firms. To
engage in business relationships with small firms a focal firm is subject to higher
uncertainty and needs to gather additional information, which is often not
available. While external signals may provide some referral, such as small firms’
membership in trade and industry associations, these are imperfect sources.
Thus, the focal firm is likely to prefer exchanging via formal and contractual
arrangements that provide at least some degree of stability to the exchange
and decreases the likelihood of opportunistic behaviors even in the presence of
ineffective regulatory institutions.
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Hypothesis 1: Large firms are more likely to have formal, as opposed to
informal, business relationships in their business network than small firms.
Business relationships with financial firms
As firms grow, their financial demands increase and the inability of the
personal ties to pool together the financial resources required may determine the
need to seek financial institutions. Small firms will find it difficult to attract financial
resources from external sources due to high perceived risk (Singh et al., 1986;
Baum & Oliver, 1991) and prohibitive costs of public offerings (Aggarwal & Rivoli,
1991). However, as the focal firms grow and become established in the market,
accumulate experience, build a track record of success, increase internal
formalization, and adopt transparent internal decision-making processes, their credit
ratings are likely to improve and attract financial service firms’ interest. Therefore,
larger firms are likely to ‘calculatively’ (Hite & Hesterly, 2001) establish ties to co-
opt financial service firms and alleviate financial resource dependence (Rowley et
al., 2000) that informal ties cannot overcome. Financial service firms such as banks
or leasing are also more likely to get involved with larger and established firms
than with smaller firms due to lower transaction costs incurred.
In transition economies, the capital market and the financial institutions are
generally underdeveloped, ineffective, and inefficient (Perotti, 1993; Newman,
2000). To overcome this limitation, firms may resort to informal sources of capital
(Newman, 2000). Alternatively, firms may seek foreign financial service firms. Most
local (national or regional) banks in transition economies continue to be largely
state owned and tend to sustain loans to non-performing and over-indebted state-
owned firms (Perotti, 1993; Stiglitz, 1994), less often extending loans to private
enterprises (Stiglitz, 1994; Jelic et al., 1999). Technologically obsolete local banks
are unable to evaluate the viability of private or privatized firms especially when
these firms are small.
Hypothesis 2.1. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships
to local financial service firms in their business network than small firms.
Foreign financial service firms are also important sources of financial capital
for firms. Foreign banks are particularly important given the shortage of liquidity by
local banks in transition economies (Stiglitz, 1994). Foreign financial service firms
are unlikely to finance the operations and/or investments of small firms except in
limited and specific situations of a provable track record of, for example, innovative
performance. However, the majority of the small firms do not have the reputation
and legitimacy nor the track record of accomplishments needed, which heightens
foreign financial firms’ uncertainty. Furthermore, the transaction costs of lending to
small firms increase in the form of uncertainty and information needs simply because
it is more difficult to obtain independent and reliable data on small firms than on
large firms, particularly on large public firms. An inefficient pool of regulatory
institutions heightens these risks and costs. Hence, it is more likely that foreign
financial service firms will engage in business transactions with large and legitimized
firms rather than with small firms.
An alternative explanation relies on the search capabilities of firms. In
comparison to large firms, small firms may rely more on cohesive informal
relationships (i.e., relationships to friends or acquaintanceships) because their
search capabilities are limited to the neighboring landscape and are less likely to
be aware of the full range of financing possibilities (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). This
may signify that small firms do not search for financing opportunities outside their
local (regional or national) areas. Therefore, these small firms may be unaware of
the possibilities or the procedures to obtain foreign financing. Conversely, large
firms possess more resources, broader search capabilities, and more knowledge
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on various mechanisms, namely on the processes required to obtain foreign
financing by foreign financial services firms.
Hypothesis 2.2. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships
to foreign financial service firms in their business network than small firms.
Business relationships with foreign partners
Firms in transition economies have significant benefits from interfaces with
foreign firms for technological learning, to speed their internationalization, and to
detect market opportunities in foreign markets. However, the development of
relationships with foreign clients and suppliers is likely to be dependent on the
foreign partners’ perception of the focal firms’ credibility and capacity to meet their
obligations. The major barriers for foreign firms’ interests in establishing exchange
relations with the focal firms include the lack of knowledge about the focal firms’
trustworthiness, the inability to measure accurately the focal firms’ performance,
or the absolute lack of knowledge on the focal firms’ existence. In fact, foreign
firms will have an even higher difficulty of evaluating the focal firms’ status and
performance than other domestic firms do when the information available is less
reliable. Therefore, large firms are more likely than small firms to have business
relationships with foreign organizations.
Large firms have a more developed and possibly more extensive pool of
business relationships to both domestic and foreign firms that serve as referrals
for legitimacy and corporate strategy (Human & Provan, 2000). These relationships
highlight that they are trustworthy and capable. Furthermore, large firms are likely
to seek foreign markets (clients) to place their products as a market diversification
strategy. However, to access foreign markets focal firms need to have some
knowledge of the market, which necessitates local collaboration. Jack and Anderson
(2002), for example, found that various market exploiting opportunities are
embedded in the local structure and cannot be recognized and explored without
social embeddedness – that is, without relationships to locally-based agents.
Business relationships to foreign clients and suppliers may be bridges for the
detection of market opportunities in foreign markets. In sum, we suggest that
large firms are more likely to have business relationships with foreign clients because
large firms have larger manufacturing capacities that may satisfy the clients needs,
have more exposure to foreign contacts (e.g. participation in trade fairs, and other
events), and are more reliable in terms of meeting and fulfilling contracts than
smaller firms. Furthermore, as discussed above, the added reputation and credibility
of large firms lowers transaction costs, which is particularly important in transition
economies.
Hypothesis 3.1. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships
with foreign client firms in their business network than small firms.
It is likely that managers’ discretionary freedom in small firms to make
decisions without significant control from external agents and institutions may
increase the perceived risk of doing business with these small firms (Huang et
al., 2003). Although this is likely to occur in any country and any economic system,
it is likely to be more seriously considered in the face of ineffective institutions.
Conversely, the external monitoring mechanisms adopted by large firms,
particularly publicly-traded firms, reduce managers’ discretionary decision making
power (Huang et al., 2003). The difference is more than trivial as it decreases the
perception of risk associated with a focal firm, particularly in what concerns
payments to suppliers, meeting deadlines, and use of the firm’s funds. To conclude,
it is likely that large firms may seek foreign supply partners to satisfy resource
needs not being met in the home market. Furthermore, procuring inputs on a
worldwide scale provides larger control over timing, quantities, and qualities and
provides a cost arbitrage advantage.
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Hypothesis 3.2. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships
to foreign supplier firms in their business network than small firms.
Business relationships with the government
The government is a major economic player in any economy and particularly
in economies that are still in transition from a centrally planned economic system.
The government or government agencies are major clients, suppliers, and investors
in the majority of the industries (Henisz, 2001). As a large client, the government
is likely to have strict criteria to ascertain from which firms it should procure goods
and services. In fact, in many countries, governmental agencies specify the norms
and requirements that suppliers need to fulfill to qualify (e.g. ISO 9000 and 14000).
The government also procures in large quantities and seeks firms with higher stability
and reputation. Finally, the government often pays its purchases after several
months requiring firms to have the financial capacity to carry accounts. Therefore,
we suggest that the government is more likely to procure from large established
firms and, hence, large firms are more likely to have business ties to governmental
agencies for supply purposes.
Hypothesis 4.1. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships
to the government and governmental agencies in their business network than are
small firms
Governments invest in firms for a variety of reasons, some of which strategic,
others political, and yet others for social motives. For example, the government
may be a partner or an investor in industries that are considered to be of strategic
interest for the country but that require too large of an investment to trigger private
interest (e.g., railroads, military equipment and defense, and energy). Other ti-
mes, the government invests in firms to prevent bankruptcy and to avoid the political
and social distress that follows a large loss of jobs. In addition, the government or
affiliated agencies often invest in large development projects that require the
pooling of private and public finances (e.g., large dams, highways) and may do so
by acquiring an equity stake in an incumbent firm. Therefore, it seems reasonable
to suggest that the government as an investor is keener on investing in firms with
an established reputation, that are larger and more able to offer warranties. The
informational market imperfections in transition economies make this preference
more salient.
Hypothesis 4.2. Large firms are more likely to have business relationships
to the government and governmental agencies as investors in their business
network than are small firms.
Data And Methods
Sample
The data used in this study was drawn from a survey conducted by the
World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
The survey and data are publicly available in the series Business Enterprise
Environment Survey1 (BEEPS survey). The survey data was collected through phone
interviews to top managers (e.g. CEO, President, Director, Manager, Owner,
Proprietor) of firms from twenty-six transition economies during 1999-2000. We
1 Survey and dataset accessible at http://econ.worldbank.org.
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excluded the surveys with missing data in the variables of interest, state-owned
firms, cooperatives, and non-profit organizations. We also excluded firms founded
prior to 1985 because the majority of the firms in the dataset were younger than
ten years and the remaining were predominantly state-owned. Our final sample
was composed of 3,048 firms. The countries included in the dataset are: Albania,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova,
Poland, Rep. Serpska, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Ukraine, and
Uzbekistan.
The extant research has acknowledged the transformation in the institutional
structures and organizations that accompanied the fall of communism in the
transition economies, mostly Central and Eastern European countries (e.g.,
Newman, 2000; Peng & Luo, 2000; Roth & Kostova, 2003). By transition economies
we refer to those economies where the institutional changes underway are
profound enough to cause a restructuring of firms’ business relationships. These
changes are characteristic of the transition economies, and differ markedly from
the transformations occurring in the emerging economies of Central and South
America, for instance. Aghion and Schankerman (1999) noted how the institutional
and physical infrastructures inherited from the socialist era are inadequate and
the challenges that firms face in these environments. Newman (2000) referred to
dramatic changes in the legal, political and regulatory frameworks in transition
economies.  Despite some inter-country variations, the institutional inadequacies
during the transition period are common and similar (even if not identical) to all
transition economies. These countries’ institutions are still engrained in the pro-
cesses that characterized the communist regime, which signifies that these countries
lack market-oriented institutions, efficient legal and regulatory frameworks to
enforce contracts, to protect private property, and to preserve a level playing field
for private investment and individual initiative. Moreover, all the countries included
in the sample were identified by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development as “countries in transition”.
Measures
Dependent variables - The dependent variables reflect the composition of
a firm’s network of business relationships and specifically the existence of business
relationships with a certain economic agent. Specifically, there is a business
relationship if there is any form of tie that is reported by the firm in the survey. We
coded into dummy variables each of the following nine business relationships that
may exist in a firm’s network: relationships with foreign firms as clients (FOREIGCL),
foreign firms as suppliers (FOREIGSUP), foreign firms as equity owners or
shareholders (FOREIGPT), government and/or governmental agencies as client
(GOVERCL), government and/or governmental agencies as equity owners or
shareholders (GOVERPT), national financial service firms (banks) as investors
(FINNABA), and foreign financial service firms as investors (FINFORBA). The focal
firm’s informal relationships (FININFOR) reflect whether the firm relies on family,
friends, and other traditional informal sources (e.g., money lender, supplier credit)
for resources. Given the emphasis of prior literature on family and friends as the
main informal resource suppliers, we identified the relationships with families and
friends (FINFAMIL) as a sub-case of informal relationships.
Independent and control variables - Firm size (Size) was measured by the
fixed assets as a categorical variable ranging from 1 (fixed assets less than
$250,000) to 10 (fixed assets greater than $500 million). We achieved similar
regression results when using the sales volume and the number of employees as
203o&s - v.15 - n.46 - Julho/Setembro - 2008
Composition of Small and Large Firms’ Business Networksin Transition Economies
alternative measurements of firms’ size. The correlation between firms size
measured by fixed assets and measured by sales was .7 and statistically significant.
Prior research has indicated that the likelihood of forming business
relationships with certain agents may be associated with the firm’s age, industry
background, physical location, legal form, and public status. Therefore, we included
several control variables in our logistic regression models to account for these
alternative explanations. Firms’ age has been conceptually argued to influence
the composition of their network (e.g., Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Huang et al., 2003).
For example, older firms may have more experience and resources to build their
business relationships with various market players. Firms’ age was constructed as
the difference between the year of founding and 2000. Age in our sample varies
from one to fifteen (i.e., founded in 1985 or later).
The firms’ industry may also have an effect on its network composition. For
example, the differences in market characteristics may lead to variations in
opportunities to form partnerships. The control for industry2 is set as dummy
variable that equals 1 for service firms and 0 for manufacturing firms. Participation
in trade associations (Trade association) is a dummy variable that captures
whether the firm is member of a trade association. Participation in trade
associations may enhance firms’ visibility, reputation, legitimacy, endorsement,
and extension of their information channels facilitating the formation of business
relationships. We also control for firms’ legal form (Legal form) such as single
proprietorship, partnership, and corporation. In addition, we included two controls
for firm location: the country of the firms (26 dummies) and the size of the city
where they are located (Large city). We classify the city as large if it has more
than 250.000 citizens or if it is the country’s capital. Finally, we coded the firms
origin in three dummy variables: private firms (equals 1 if the firm is private since
establishment), joint ventures (JV) (equals 1 if the firm was established as a joint
venture between domestic and foreign partners), and privatized firms (equals 1
if the firm resulted from the privatization of a previously state-owned firm).
Results
In Tables 1 and 2, we provide descriptive statistics and correlations for all
variables. Although there are a number of significant correlations, none is high
enough to raise multicollinearity concerns (Hair et al., 1995). We used variance
inflation factors (VIF) to test for multicollinearity and none of the VIF scores
approached the commonly accepted threshold of 10 to indicate multicollinearity.
One of the noteworthy correlations in Table 2 is between firm size and age which
is very low (0.14) and significant. In prior studies these variables have been
confounded, which may explain the difficulties in clearly distinguishing the
independent effects of size and age. The unexpected low correlation between firm
size and age is an advantage in our sample because we avoid possible confounding
effects of these two variables on our dependent variables, as may occur whenever
there is a high correlation between firms’ size and age. However, the low correlation
may also reflect limitations of our sample. Firm age ranges from one to fifteen
years old, which, under most industry conditions, implies relatively young firms.
The mean age of the firms in our sample is 6.95 years, 33 percent are at most five
years old and 91 percent are at most ten years old. Firms at this stage may still
suffer from a liability of newness or of adolescence.
2 Although a larger differentiation of industries would be desirable this is not permitted given the data
used.
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Table 1 - Means and Standard Deviations
Table 2 - Correlations Matrix
Note: *p<0.05
Results of the logistic regression models used to test the hypotheses are
presented in Table 3. The dependent variables capture whether the focal firms
have a certain type of business relationship (client, supplier, and investor) with a
certain agent (e.g., family/friends, national financial firms, government, foreign
financial firms). To test these hypotheses we ran nine logistic regressions and
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
FOREIGPT 2964 0.14 0.34 0 1 
FOREISUP 2963 0.33 0.47 0 1 
FOREIGCL 2907 0.26 0.44 0 1 
GOVERPT 2964 0.06 0.24 0 1 
GOVERCL 2821 0.46 0.50 0 1 
FINFAMIL 2838 0.19 0.39 0 1 
FININFOR 2838 0.08 0.28 0 1 
FINNABA 2838 0.21 0.41 0 1 
FINFORBA 2838 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Size 2968 1.97 1.66 1 10 
Age 2968 6.95 2.57 1 15 
Industry 2967 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Country 2968 14.77 7.48 1 26 
Large city 2968 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Private firm 2968 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Privatized firm 2968 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Joint venture 2968 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Legal form 2967 2.68 1.53 1 6 
Trade 
association 2968 0.22 0.41 0 1 
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examined the probability of occurrence of a certain business relationship. With the
significance level at 99.9%, our logistic regression models were significant as
indicated by the models’ Chi-square values.
Table 3 - Logistic Regression Models
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients.  †  p<.10;  * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<0.001
FININFOR- informal relationships, FINFAMIL - relationships with family members and friends,
FINNABA - financing by national bank, FOREIGCL - foreign client, FOREISUP - foreign supplier,
FOREIGGPT - foreign investor/partner, GOVERCL - government as client, GOVERPT -
government as investor/partner.
Hypothesis 1 suggested that large firms were more likely to have formal
relationships, and, conversely, that small firms were more likely to rely on informal
relationships. Models 1 and 2 tested this hypothesis. In Model 2, firm size was
significantly related to the formation of informal relationships (â=-0.15, p< .01).
However, the coefficient estimated in Model 1 is not statistically significant. As firms’
size increases, it seems that they are less likely to maintain informal business
relationships to family and friends. Therefore, hypothesis 1 received only partial
support.
Hypothesis 2 advanced that, in contrast to small firms, large firms were more
likely to have relationships with both national financial firms (Hypothesis 2.1) and
foreign financial firms (Hypothesis 2.2). In fact, we found firm size to be significantly
related to the likelihood of having business relationships with local financial firms
in Model 3 (â=0.13, p< .001) and with foreign financial firms (banks) in Model 4
(â=0.35, p< .001). Therefore, both Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 were supported.
Model 5 and Model 6 tested the third set of hypotheses. Both coefficients of
firms’ size were positive and significant (â=0.27, p<0.001 in Model 5; â=0.31, p<
.001 in Model 6). In addition, we used Model 7 to examine whether larger firms
tended to have foreign firms as equity investors. The coefficient is positive and
statistically significant (â=0.29, p<.001). Hence, Hypotheses 3.1 and 3.2 were
supported confirming that large firms are more likely to have foreign firms in their
business networks as clients (Hypothesis 3.1) and as suppliers (Hypothesis 3.2).
Hypotheses 4.1 and 4.2 proposed that firms’ size is positively associated
with their involvement with the government. Both statements found strong support
(â=0.07, p<0.01 in Model 8; and â=0.14, p< .01 in Model 9). Therefore, Hypotheses
4.1 and 4.2 were also supported.
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Additional results
Firms’ legal form
We extended our analysis to firms’ legal form. We observed that firms
originated as joint ventures with foreign firms were more likely to be involved with
foreign firms as suppliers, clients, and/or investors (see models 4, 5, and 6 in Table
3). Joint ventures were also more likely to obtain financial resource from foreign
financial institutions than either private firms or privatized state-owned firms. This
result seems to indicate that business relationships are cumulative and entail a
positive spillover. However, the small number of joint ventures in the sample requires
caution in potential extrapolations. In addition, private firms are more likely to
have a higher proportion of informal business relationships. A simple explanation
is that these firms may have a liability of newness and that it is likely to be more
difficult for new firms to establish formal ties due to a lack of reputation and
legitimacy, as discussed previously. It may also be specific to our data where new
firms predominate. Furthermore, firms that result from privatization of formerly
state-owned enterprises have more relationships with national financial service
firms. A possible explanation is that privatized firms have to rely more on financial
institutions for resources because they have lost, at least partially, the financial
backing of the government.
Countries environmental idiosyncrasies
To examine whether the relationships verified on the composition of business
networks in transition economies are universal or particular to all countries, we
conduct a sub-group analysis for selected countries. To select these countries, we
utilized the CIA World Factbook (www.cia.gov) to determine the population and
GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity: PPP). We also looked at the countries
that either joined or which are most likely to join the European Union3. We
restricted the analyses to the following countries: Bulgaria (GDPpc PPP
4: $6.600,
population: 7.621), Czech Republic (GDPpc PPP: $15.300, population: 10.257),
Poland (GDPpc PPP: $9.500, population: 38.625), Hungary (GDPpc PPP: $13.300,
population: 10.075), Turkey (GDPpc PPP: $7.000, population: 67.309), Ukraine
(GDPpc PPP: $4.200, population: 48.396), and Russia (GDPpc PPP: $8.800,
population: 144.978).
The results in Table 4 below show that, in these countries, firms’ business
relationships with the government still play a major role beyond a level we expect
in more institutionally developed countries. In Ukraine, about 65 percent, and in
Poland and Russia, about 55 percent of firms have supply ties with the government.
The extremely high participation of the government as a client may reflect
reminiscences of a centrally planned economy. However, given that our sample is
limited to privately-held firms the government appears as a small investor. Perhaps,
even though the government may be decreasing its economic participation in these
countries, the reconfiguration of firms’ business network is taking time to form and
that these firms are still highly dependent on procurement ties with governmental
agencies.
3 The European Union candidate countries are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey.
4 GDP per capita PPP – Gross Domestic Product per capita at purchasing power parity. These values
refer to the year 2002 or latest available.
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Table 4 - Comparison of Network Composition in Selected Countries
% Bulgaria Czech 
Republic 
Poland Russia Turkey Hungary Ukraine 
FOREIGPT 10.22 21.24 18.52 6.51 9.23 23.48 12.96 
FOREIGSUP 24.14 27.43 29.63 15.75 26.15 30.43 27.31 
FOREIGCL 21.84 28.57 35.00 9.39 29.69 21.62 23.11 
GOVERPT 9.09 0.00 4.50 9.16 0.00 5.22 5.56 
GOVERCL 32.47 44.86 54.49 54.45 30.16 33.64 65.00 
FINFAMIL 44.58 29.00 7.60 15.42 30.77 21.93 18.98 
FININFOR 14.46 26.00 11.39 7.05 3.08 4.39 8.80 
FINNABA 22.89 12.00 36.08 20.26 43.08 14.04 19.44 
FINFORBA 2.40 9.00 3.80 1.32 3.08 2.63 1.39 
 Note: the values indicate the % of firms’ business relationships. These values do not add
to 100% since each firm may carry simultaneously several types of ties and to multiple
agents.
In general, firms across all these seven countries carry a substantial portion
of informal ties such as the ties to family and friends. This finding is consistent with
Roth and Kostova’s (2001) study. Yet, a closer observation revealed that the
importance of informal relationships differs pronouncedly across countries. For
example, approximately 45% of the informal relationships of Bulgarian firms are
composed of families and friends while these account for 10% for Polish firms.
Therefore, although informal relationships play an important role in the networks
of firms in transition economies, other macro-level factors (e.g., national culture,
maturity of capital market) may still lead to different emphasis on firms’ reliance on
personal ties for business relationships.
Business relationships to foreign investors are particularly frequent in Hungary
and Czech Republic. However, foreign firms are more important as clients and
suppliers than as investors across our sample. This picture may be changing as a
growing number of foreign firms (namely from Western Europe) relocate the more
labor-intensive activities to transition economies. The prospect that more of these
countries may join the European Union is likely to bring even more economic, political,
and social stability to the region. Financing from foreign banks plays, still, a limited
role in the pool of financing sources, but we may expect their importance to increase
as political and economic risk decrease and larger multinationals set operations in
these countries.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this study we examined the composition of the network of business
relationships of firms of different sizes and from transition economies. The results
indicate that in contrast to smaller firms, larger firms are more like to have formal
business relationships, and relationships with local and foreign financial institutions,
government/government agencies, and foreign firms. This study contributes to a
better understanding of small and large firms’ business network. Furthermore, it
contributes not only to the social network literature by investigating empirically
the composition of firms’ business networks in terms of the type and the role of
the network members, but also to the international business literature by exploring
firms’ business relationships in the context of transition economies. We tested
some hypotheses that have been conceptualized, although not empirically tested,
in prior research.
While business networks have been studied in developed countries,
considerably less attention has been devoted to firms’ networks in transition
countries. The institutional, political, and economic context in transition economies
may not allow generalizations to developed countries. However, the expected
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economic development of the transition economies, particularly those in Eastern
Europe, and the fact that at least some of these countries have joined the European
Union makes them an interesting object of study. In fact, this setting is important
as it allows us to observe countries whose business environments are substantially
different from that of the US or Western European countries. New insights, with
the potential for theory generation, may also emerge from analyzing business
networks in countries that are shifting from a centrally planned economic system
to a market-based economic system.
Our study further sheds some insights into how the configuration of firms’
business networks may affect transition economies’ ability to be innovative. For
example, if the national firms have business relationships predominantly to other
national firms, this may hinder their ability to introduce major modifications in the
technological path of the country (Kogut, 1991). Conversely, if national firms have
ties that span the national boundaries it is likely they may engage in a mix of
exploitation and exploration of various technological trajectories (Kogut, 1991;
March, 1991). For example, small firms are likely to be constrained to local searches
(Lipparini & Sobrero, 1994), because their ties tend to be local and less diverse.
Conversely, large firms are more likely to have broader ties and be able to explore
both locally and internationally. Large firms also have larger resources to commit
to those searches. Nevertheless, the impact of firms’ business ties for innovation
in transition economies warrants additional research.
How do firms construct, re-construct, and adjust their network of business
relationships throughout their life cycles? Hite and Hesterly (2001) suggested that
firms’ networks evolve to accommodate emerging resource needs and changes in
external pressures. While small and new firms may establish relationships with
the purpose of overcoming a lack of legitimacy and reputation, in later stages, the
main purpose of business relationships may be to satisfy resource needs or different
types of legitimacy (e.g. legitimacy to operate in foreign markets, to partner with
the Government). However, this reasoning does not address explicitly the
institutional environment factors. The understanding of firms’ business networks
requires that we examine the resource dependencies that lead to certain
compositions of firms’ business networks in each stage of firms evolution (Pfeffer &
Salancik, 1978), the environmental institutional effects (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983),
and the firms’ strategies (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). Furthermore, given that size is a
major dimension along which firms evolve, this analysis has a potential for extension
in other dimensions that also characterize the evolution of firms such as age, and
product or market portfolio.
In addition to empirical evidence for the hypotheses advanced, some of our
other results are of noticeable interest. The low correlation between age and size
is interesting and may reflect the profound institutional, economic, and political
shifts taking place in transition economies. Thus, this low correlation may be a
natural outcome when studying firms from transition economies rather than an
artifact of the data used. In addition, given that access to economic agents is
important in establishing business relationships, we included the size of the city in
which the firm is located. The results indicate that the larger the city the more likely
the firm has relationships to a variety of agents. Firms in larger cities have easier
access to the government, to foreign agents and to local financial institutions.
Thus is, larger cities seem to be more munificent (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003) and
firms in these cities resort to informal ties less often (the coefficients for FINFAMIL
and FININFOR are negative and significant in models 1 and 2 in Table 3) than firms
in smaller cities.
We further note that membership in trade associations seems to be
particularly relevant for forming ties with foreign firms regardless of the function of
the tie. This is consistent with the idea that membership in trade associations
increases the firms’ visibility in the international markets and may serve as a
reputation referral decreasing the perceived transaction costs incurred by foreign
firms. Interestingly, privatized firms seem to suffer more from higher hazards in
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establishing business relationships than private firms, which may be due to the
recency of the privatization projects and to the often quite radical modernization
and restructuring that firms undergo post-privatization. It is possible that the
restructuring is increasing the perceived risks of carrying exchanges with these
firms.
Finally, we suggest that country idiosyncratic variables may be strong
determinants of the composition of firms’ network. National culture, societal norms,
and values may influence the types of ties established. For instance, Hungary and
Poland are predominantly Catholic, whereas the central Asian countries in the
sample are predominantly Muslim, which may have an impact on financing.
Governmental influences, regulatory and legal policies, and social characteristics
are other possible contextual factors. For example, it may be that inter-firm trust
and stable business relationships are major and effective governance mechanisms
against risks of opportunistic behaviors (Williamson, 1985; Dyer & Singh, 1998). In
fact, trust among partner firms has been noted as an essential condition for efficient
economic transactions. Trust may even be a substitute to overcome institutional
failures in transition countries. Future research may assess what is the role of
trust for the formation of business relationships in transition economies and how
the profound economic transformations affect the stability of trust-based exchanges.
In this regard, it is possible that the informal business relationships tend to be
more reliant on inter-firm trust than on formal and contractual relationships.
Limitations and other research avenues
This study is based on a cross-sectional analysis. The data only permits us
to characterize the situation in a single point in time. In addition, we have access
to past data simply based on top managers’ recall. Scholars have questioned the
reliance on executives’ recall of previous company issues. For instance, Golden
(1992) suggested that retrospective reports of important organizational phenomena
may be inaccurate and somewhat misleading. However, retrospective reports have
been commonly used in strategic management and organization theory research.
For example, Miller, Cardinal, and Glick (1997) responded to Golden’s critique by
showing that retrospective reporting is a viable research methodology if the
measures used are adequately reliable and valid. Notwithstanding, further insights
may be achieved by utilizing longitudinal data and data from diverse sources rather
than from a single source. Future research may use data dedicated to support this
line of research rather than publicly available data. However, the cost of surveying
and interviewing firms in each of these countries is likely to be a prohibitive
constraint.
We were primarily interested in the composition of the network of business
relationships and therefore, we did not delve substantially into contextual factors
(e.g., cultural variations, extensiveness of corruption, demography, taxation).
However, contextual factors are important to understand how and why certain
network compositions may emerge and persist. Further, it is probable that industry
characteristics moderate some of the relationships we advanced because different
industries have different capital and technological intensities, different needs for
inter-firm collaboration, different practices in what relates to procurement relations
and venture capital, and so forth. Our restriction of industry controls to service
versus manufacturing was imposed by the data. However, future research may
provide additional insights into industry variations.
While we restricted our analyses to the ego network and the types of partners
that compose firms’ business network, future research may examine the specific
functional composition of the network (e.g., ties for R&D, specific supply components,
distribution channels). An immediate question is; how do firms’ business networks
influence R&D, innovation outcomes, specialization, and business scope in transition
economies?
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Finally, future research may examine whether the formation of business
relationships is cumulative. If prior affiliations provide endorsement and increase
the likelihood that the focal firms will be able to develop subsequent business
relationships with other organizations (Baum & Singh, 1994), we could expect that
prior ties to the government would provide that legitimacy. For example, business
relationships with the government or with foreign firms could be a signal of quality,
managerial ability, stability, honor payments and agreements. However, that does
not seem to be the case in our sample where privatized firms which should benefit
from prior ties to the government, do not seem to hold any advantage. Therefore,
future research may advance our understanding on the extent to which the firms’
current network of business relationships is a determinant of their future network
composition.
To conclude, the study of the composition of firms’ business network
contributes to our understanding of the organization of economic exchanges and
the idiosyncrasies of firms’ interactions in transition economies. While firms in
transition economies are predictably similar because of a somewhat common recent
history and institutional background, they are also predictably dissimilar from
Western firms. Understanding firms’ business network can help determine how
firms overcome the uncertainties and limitations imposed by severe institutional
and economic transformations occurring in transition economies. The ability to
establish a variety of ties determines these firms’ ability to obtain the resources
needed to survive and grow during and post the transition period. The inter-country
comparison showed substantial differences evidencing different progress in the
transition process. However, overall, informal relationships and ties to the
government are still very significant. Larger firms seem to be more capable of
establishing business relationships, than smaller firms, with both domestic and
foreign firms, which raises some concerns on the national ability to develop a stable
industry and to innovate.
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